Two important characteristics of current equity markets are the large number of trading venues with publicly displayed order books and the substantial fraction of trading that takes place in the dark, outside such visible order books. This paper evaluates the impact of dark trading and fragmentation in visible order books on liquidity.
Introduction
Equity markets in the US, Europe and Canada have seen a proliferation of new trading venues. The traditional stock exchanges are challenged by a variety of trading systems, such as electronic communication networks (ECNs), broker-dealer crossing networks, dark pools and over-the-counter markets (OTC). Consequently, trading has become dispersed over many trading venues -visible and dark-creating a fragmented market place. These changes in market structure follow recent changes in financial regulation, in particular the Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in the US and the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in Europe.
An important question is how market quality is affected by the many and different types of competing venues. In this paper, we study the impact of market fragmentation on liquidity, which is an important aspect of market quality. We investigate the impact of different types of fragmentation by classifying trading venues according to pre-trade transparency into visible and dark venues, i.e., with and without publicly displayed limit order books.
According to this definition, US stocks have a dark market share of approximately 30%
and European blue chips of 40%. 1 Recently, the SEC is conducting a broad review of current equity markets, and is particularly interested in the effect of dark trading on execution quality. 2 Both the impact of fragmentation in visible order books and dark trading on equity markets have since long interested researchers, regulators, investors and trading institutions. 3 In a recent study, O'Hara and Ye (2011) find that fragmentation lowers transaction costs and increases execution speed for NYSE and Nasdaq stocks. They do not distinguish, however, between the differential impact on liquidity of fragmentation stemming from visible and dark trading venues. The main contribution of our paper is that we disentangle the liquidity effects of both fragmentation in visible order books ("visible fragmentation" for short) and dark trading. In addition, we address regulatory issues of fair markets and retail investor protection. To this end, we distinguish between liquidity aggregated over all trading venues (global liquidity) and liquidity of the traditional market only (local liquidity). Global liquidity is available to investors using Smart Order Routing Technology and local liquidity is accessible to investors who tap the traditional market only. We furthermore improve upon previous research by employing a new dataset that covers the relevant universe of trading platforms, provides stronger identification of fragmentation and allows for improved liquidity metrics.
Our main finding is that the effect of visible fragmentation on global liquidity is generally positive, while the effect of dark trading is negative. An increase in dark trading of one standard deviation lowers global liquidity by 9%. The effect of visible fragmentation has an inverted U-shape, i.e. the marginal effect is declining when fragmentation increases. Employing our most conservative estimates, the optimal degree of visible fragmentation improves global liquidity with approximately 32% compared with a completely concentrated market. In addition, we find that the gains of visible fragmentation mainly hold for liquidity close to the midpoint, i.e. at relatively good price levels, but to a much lesser extent for liquidity deeper in the order book, which improves by only 12%. This result suggests that newly entering trading venues with visible order books primarily improve liquidity close to the midpoint. Furthermore, compared to small stocks, trading in large stocks is more fragmented and its liquidity benefits twice as much from fragmentation. This suggests that competition between trading venues is fiercer for large stocks than for small stocks.
While global liquidity benefits from fragmentation, we find that the market quality at the traditional stock exchange is worse off as local liquidity close to the midpoint reduces by approximately 10%. As such, investors without access to Smart Order Routing Technology are worse off in a fragmented market, especially for relatively small orders.
We address the impact of fragmentation on market liquidity by creating, for every firm, daily proxies of visible fragmentation, dark activity and liquidity, employing information from all relevant trading venues. Specifically, we study a period before fragmentation set in, January 2006, until the end of 2009, when markets were already quite fragmented.
Similar to Foucault and Menkveld (2008) , we select all Dutch mid-and large-cap stocks, which are relatively large with an average market capitalization approximately twice that of the NYSE and Nasdaq stocks analyzed in O' Hara and Ye (2011) . We measure the degree of visible fragmentation by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H H I , the sum of the squared market shares) based on executed trades on all visible trading venues. Dark trading is captured by the market share of traded volume on dark venues and OTC. Then, for each stock we construct a consolidated limit order book (i.e., the limit order books of all visible trading venues combined) to get a complete picture of the global liquidity available in the market. Based on the consolidated order book we analyze global liquidity at the best price levels, but also deeper in the order book. This is important, as the depth of the order book reflects the quantity immediately available for trading and accordingly the price of immediacy. Next to global liquidity, we also analyze local liquidity, available at the traditional exchange only.
Our panel dataset helps to identify the exogenous relation between liquidity and fragmentation by means of firm-quarter fixed effects. The inclusion of firm-quarter dummies implies that the impact of fragmentation on liquidity stems from variation within a firmquarter, making the analysis robust to various industry specific shocks and time-varying firm specific shocks. Furthermore, in order to address concerns about endogeneity of visible fragmentation and dark trading, we use instrumental variables. Similar to O'Hara and
Ye (2011), we use as instruments for visible fragmentation the average order size of the visible competitors, and also the number of limit orders to market orders on the visible competitors. Dark trading is instrumented by the average dark order size.
Our findings on liquidity can be related to several recent studies. The positive effect of fragmentation on visible trading venues is consistent with competition between liquidity suppliers, since the compensation for liquidity suppliers, the realized spread, reduces with fragmentation. A similar argument is made in Foucault and Menkveld (2008) , who study competition between the LSE and Euronext for Dutch stocks in 2004, and find that fragmentation over these two traditional stock markets improves liquidity. The negative impact of dark trading is consistent with a "cream-skimming" effect between dark and visible markets, since the informativeness of trades, the price impact, strongly increases with dark activity. The "cream-skimming" effect is predicted by Zhu (2011) , who argues that informed investors face low execution probabilities in crossing networks and dark pools because they typically trade at the same side of the order book. Consequently, dark markets attract predominantly uninformed traders, leaving the informed trades to visible markets.
The negative effect of dark trading can also be related to pre-trade transparency, as visible markets are more efficient because of faster and cheaper access to information, in line with e.g., Biais, Bisière, and Spatt (2010) and Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) .
In line with our results, Weaver (2011) shows that off exchange reported trades, which mostly represent dark trades in his sample, negatively affect market quality for US stocks.
In contrast to our results, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a) find that dark pool activity is positively related to liquidity in the cross section. In their time series regressions however, similar to ours, the effect of dark pool activity on liquidity is economically insignificant and statistically marginally significant. We contribute to Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a) by controlling for visible fragmentation.
In sum, our findings imply a deeper understanding of the more general conclusion of O'Hara and Ye (2011) that fragmentation does not harm market quality. We show that the composition of the fragmentation -visible versus dark -determines the total impact of fragmentation on market quality. Moreover, our conclusions especially relate to the issues raised by the SEC on the benefits and drawbacks of stock market fragmentation, and show that the benefits are not equally enjoyed by all stock market participants. This latter finding is particularly relevant to regulators who strive for fair markets and protection of retail investors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses literature on competition between exchanges. The dataset and liquidity measures are described in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 explains the methodology and main results, while section 6 reports a series of robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Literature on fragmentation and market quality
There is a trade-off between order flow fragmentation and competition. A single exchange benefits from lower costs, compared with a fragmented market structure. These consist of the fixed costs to set up a new trading venue; fixed costs for clearing and settlement; costs of monitoring several trading venues simultaneously; and advanced technological infrastructure to aggregate dispersed information in the market and connect to several trading venues. Also, a single market that is already liquid will attract even more liquidity due to positive network externalities (e.g. Pagano (1989a) , Pagano (1989b) and Admati, Amihud, and Pfleiderer (1991) ). Each additional trader reduces the stock's execution risk for other potential traders, attracting more traders. This positive feedback should cause all trades to be executed at a single market, obtaining the highest degree of liquidity.
However, while network externalities are still relevant, nowadays they may be realized even when several trading venues coexist. This happens to the extent that the technological infrastructure seamlessly links the individual trading venues, creating effectively one market. From a broker's point of view, the market is then virtually not fragmented, which alleviates the drawbacks of fragmentation (Stoll, 2006) . 4 In addition, fragmentation might also enhance market quality, as increased competition among liquidity suppliers forces them to improve their prices, narrowing the bid-ask spreads (e.g. Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000) and Battalio (1997) ). Confirming a competition effect, Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2003) find that Alternative Trading Systems in general have lower execution costs compared with brokers on traditional exchanges. Furthermore, Biais, Bisière, and Spatt (2010) investigate the competition induced by ECN activity on Nasdaq stocks. They find that ECNs with smaller tick sizes tend to undercut the Nasdaq quotes and reduce overall quoted spreads.
Differences between trading venues may arise to cater to the needs of heterogeneous clientele. For example, investors differ in their preferences for trading speed, order sizes, anonymity and likelihood of execution (Harris (1993) and Petrella (2009) ). In the US, Boehmer (2005) stresses the trade-off between speed of execution and execution costs on Nasdaq and NYSE, where Nasdaq is more expensive but also faster. In order to attract more investors, new trading venues may apply aggressive pricing schedules, such as make and take fees (Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2009 ). The fact that some investors prefer a particular trading venue can also lead to varying degrees of informed trading at each exchange.
For instance, the NYSE has been found to attract more informed order flow than the regional dealers (Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara, 1996) and Nasdaq market makers (Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) and Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994) ). Furthermore, Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) find that ECNs attract more informed order flow than Nasdaq market makers, as ECN trades have a larger price impact. Stoll (2003) argues that competition fosters innovation and efficiency, but priority rules may not be maintained. Specifically, time priority is often violated in fragmented markets, and sometimes also price priority. 5 Foucault and Menkveld (2008) study the competition between an LSE order book (EuroSETS) and Euronext Amsterdam for AEX firms in 2004, and find a trade-through rate of 73%. They call for a prohibition of trade-throughs as it discourages liquidity provision. Possible explanations of trade-throughs are high costs 4 Confirming a high level of market integration, Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011) find that at least two venues quote the best bid and offer in 85% of the time for FTSE100 stocks in April/May 2010. 5 Time priority is violated when two limit orders with the same price are placed on two venues and the order placed last is executed first. Price priority is violated, i.e. a trade-through, when an order gets executed against a price worse than the best quoted price in the market. A partial trade-through means that only part of the order could have been executed against a better price. of monitoring multiple markets, or high variable and fixed trading fees and clearing and settlement costs. Gresse (2006) finds that trading activity on a crossing network improves quoted spreads in the dealer market, especially when the dealers also trade on the crossing network.
Next to competition between trading venues with visible liquidity, this paper is related to competition effects in dark markets, i.e. venues without publicly displayed order books.
A few papers theoretically investigate the impact of dark trading on traditional markets. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model a crossing network that competes with a dealer market, and find ambiguous effects on the dealer's spread. On the one hand, a crossing network may attract new liquidity traders and therefore lead to lower dealer spreads. On the other hand, when the dealer market is used as a market of last resort, the dealer's spread may increase. Also modeling the interaction between a crossing network and dealer market, Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts (2009) show that the order flow dynamics and welfare implications depend on the degree of transparency, but they do not endogenize the spread. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010b) model the competition between a dark pool and visible limit order book, and show that the initial level of liquidity determines the effect of the dark pool on quoted spreads. That is, for liquid stocks both limit and market orders migrate to the dark pool, leaving the spread very tight, while for illiquid stocks the competition induced by the dark pool reduces the execution probability of limit orders, causing the spread to increase. In contrast, Zhu (2011) argues that informed traders have relatively low execution probabilities in the dark pool since they typically trade on the same side of the order book. Therefore, informed trading diverts to the traditional market, which adversely affects liquidity in that market.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on algorithmic trading, 6 i.e. the use of computer programs to manage and execute trades in electronic limit order books. Algorithmic trading has strongly increased over time, and has drastically affected the trading environment (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009 ). In particular, it affects the level of market fragmentation analyzed in our sample, as computer programs and Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT) allow investors to find the best liquidity in the market by comparing the order books of individual venues. 7 Moreover, algorithmic trading is related to liquidity as it reduces implicit transaction costs by splitting up large orders into many smaller ones (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011) . Programs are also used to identify deviations 6 Algorithmic trading is also know as High Frequency Trading. 7 See e.g. Gomber and Gsell (2006) for a discussion on SORT and algorithmic trading in Europe.
from the efficient stock price, by quickly trading on new information or price changes of other securities. Furthermore, programs may provide liquidity when quoted spreads are large, e.g. when it is profitable to do so (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009 ). Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) describe "fleeting orders", a relatively new phenomenon in the US and Europe, where limit orders are placed and canceled within two seconds if they are not executed. The authors argue that fleeting orders are part of an active search for liquidity and a consequence of improved technology, more hidden liquidity and fragmented markets.
In summary, the literature suggests that fragmentation of trading may improve liquidity, and offers some empirical evidence for that. However, the empirical studies so far do not distinguish between fragmentation in visible and dark trading venues. This is precisely our contribution.
Market description, dataset and descriptive statistics

Market description
Our dataset contains 52 Dutch stocks forming the constituents of the so-called AEX Large and Mid cap indices. Over time, all these stocks are traded on several trading platforms, to a degree which is representative for the large European stocks analyzed by Gomber and Pierron (2010) . In terms of size, the average market cap of our sample is approximately twice that of the NYSE and Nasdaq sample analyzed in O' Hara and Ye (2011) . We can summarize the most important trading venues for these stocks into three groups as follows (Appendix A contains a more general description of current European financial markets). Whether these MTFs will survive depends on the current level of liquidity, but also on the quality of the trading technology (e.g. the speed of execution), the number of securities traded, make and take fees and clearing and settlement costs. Nasdaq OMX closed down in May 2010, outside our sample period, as they did not meet their targeted market share. 8 A new trading venue in Europe typically starts with a test phase in which only a few liquid firms are traded, but will allow trading in all stocks of a certain index at once when it goes Boerse, Turquoise, Bats Europe, Nasdaq OMX and SIX Swiss exchange (formerly known as Virt-X). 9 We employ data from all these venues but collect them only during the trading hours of the continuous auction of Euronext Amsterdam, i.e. between 09.00 to 17.30, See "Nasdaq OMX to close pan-European equity MTF", www.thetradenews.com. 9 The visible order books of Dutch stocks on the LSE are discarded, as those stocks have different symbols, are denoted in pennies instead of Euros, and are in essence different assets. The remaining trading venues with visible liquidity attract extremely little order flow for the firms in our sample (e.g., NYSE, Milan stock exchange, PLUS group and some smaller exchanges).
Dataset
sterdam time. Therefore, data of the opening and closing auctions at these venues are not included. 10 Each stock-venue combination is reported in a separate file and represents a single order book. Every order book contains the ten best quotes at both sides of the market, i.e. the ten highest bid and lowest ask prices and their associated quantities, summing to 40 variables per observation. 11 All observations are time stamped to the millisecond. A new "state" of a limit order book is created when a limit order arrives, gets canceled or when a trade takes place. A trade is immediately reported and we observe its associated price and quantity, as well as an update of the order book. Price and time priority rules apply within each stock-venue order book, but not between venues. Furthermore, visible orders have time priority over hidden orders. Hidden orders are not directly observed in the dataset but are detected upon execution. Therefore, we have the same information set available to the market, i.e. the visible part of the order book on a continuous basis. We treat executions of hidden and 'iceberg' orders as visible, since these trades take place on predominantly visible trading venues.
Our dataset also provides information on "dark trades", i.e. trades at dark pools, brokerdealer crossing networks, internalized and Over The Counter (including trades executed over telephone). These dark trades are part of the Thomson Reuters dataset and reported by Markit Boat, a MiFID-compliant trade reporting company. 12 While we have information regarding price, quantity and time of execution, we do not observe the identity of the underlying trading venue. In addition, we also add the OTC and internalized trades reported separately in the MiFID post trade files from Euronext, Xetra, Chi-X and the Stockholm exchange. In Table A1 in the Appendix, the characteristics of the different stocks and some descriptive statistics are presented. There is considerable variation in firm size (market capitalization), price and trading volume. In the sample, 38 stocks have a market capitalization exceeding one billion Euro, while the 14 remaining stocks have market capitalization above 100 million Euro. The table also reports realized volatilities, computed by first dividing the trading day into 34 fifteen-minute periods and then calculating stock returns of each period, based on the spread midpoint at the beginning and end of that period. The standard deviation of these stock returns are daily estimates of realized volatility. 13 The table also shows the average market share of Euronext and dark trades, calculated as of November 2007 onwards, the period for which Markit Boat data have become available in the dataset. 14 According to our data, in 2009 37% of the total traded volume is dark; which can be split up into 38% for AEX large cap firms and 20% for mid cap firms.
Descriptive statistics
Liquidity and fragmentation
The consolidated order book
The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of equity market fragmentation on liquidity.
We follow the approach of Gresse (2010) To construct the consolidated order book, we follow the methodology of Foucault and
Menkveld (2008) among others, based on snapshots of the limit order book. A snapshot contains the ten best bid and ask prices and associated quantities, for each stock-venue combination. Every minute we take snapshots of all venues and "sum" the liquidity to obtain a stock's consolidated order book. Therefore, each stock has 510 daily observations (8.5 hours times 60 minutes), containing the order books of the individual trading venues and the consolidated one.
Depth(X) liquidity measure
Our rich dataset allows to construct a liquidity measure that incorporates the limit orders beyond the best price levels; which we will refer to as the Depth.X /. The measure aggregates the Euro value of the number of shares offered within a fixed interval around the midpoint. Specifically, the midpoint is the average of the best bid and ask price of the consolidated order book and the interval is an amount X D f10; 20; :::; 50g basis points relative to the midpoint. 15 The measure is expressed in Euros and calculated every minute. Equation 1 shows the calculation for the bid and ask side separately, which are summed to obtain Depth.X /. This measure is constructed for the global and local order book (i.e., Euronext Amsterdam) separately. Define price level j D f1; 2; :::; J g on the pricing grid and the midpoint of the consolidated order book as M, then The Depth.X / measure is closely related to the Cost of Round-trip, C RT .D/ (e.g. Irvine, Benston, and Kandel (2000) and Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) ), which also analyzes liquidity deeper in the order book. 16 More specifically, C RT .D/ fixes the quantity D of a potential trade, i.e. D equals e100.000, and analyzes the impact on price. In contrast, Depth.X / fixes the price, i.e. X equals ten basis points around the midpoint, and analyzes the available quantity. Although both measures estimate the depth and slope of the order book, our approach solves two rather technical issues. First, the impact on price cannot be calculated when a stock's order book has insufficient liquidity to trade e100.000, such that the C RT .D/ does not exist. In contrast, if no additional shares are offered within the range of X and X C " basis points from the midpoint, then
Depth.X / has a zero increment and Depth.X / D Depth.X C "/. Second, C RT .D/ may become negative when the consolidated spread is negative, i.e. when the best ask price of a venue is lower than the best bid price of another venue. 17 While negative transaction costs cannot be interpreted meaningfully, the midpoint and Depth.X / are perfectly identified and reflect the available liquidity in a meaningful fashion.
An advantage of Depth.X / over the traditional quoted depth and spread is that it is not sensitive to small, price improving orders. Such orders are often placed by algorithmic traders, whose activity has increased substantially over time. In addition, the quoted depth and spread are sensitive to changes in tick sizes. 18 Figure 3 plots the 10, 50 and 90 th percentile of the depth measure against the number of basis points around the midpoint. The vertical axis is plotted on a logarithmic scale, as we work with the logarithm of the depth measures in the regression analysis. Overall, the shape of the order book appears very linear. Also, there are large differences between firms, as the 90 th percentile of Depth.10/ is e915.000, while the 10 th percentile of Depth.50/ is e72.000. This is in line with high levels of skewness and kurtosis (not reported). Table 1 contains the medians of the Depth.X / measure for the global and local order book on a yearly basis, along with other liquidity measures discussed in the next section.
As expected, the global and local depth measures vary substantially over time. However, some shocks affect liquidity close to the midpoint more than liquidity deep in the order book. That is, the ratio of Depth.50/ to Depth.10/ is not constant over time.
Other liquidity measures
This section compares our Depth.X / liquidity measure to the more traditional liquidity measures. These are the price impact, effective and realized spread, based on executed transactions, and the quoted spread and quoted depth, based on quotes in the local and global order books. The quoted depth sums the Euro amount of shares offered at the best bid and ask price, whereas the quoted spread looks at the associated prices. Appendix B contains a formal description of the measures.
The medians of the liquidity measures are reported in the upper panel of Turning to the liquidity measures based on executed trades, we observe that the median realized spread has reduced from 2.5 basis points in 2006 to 0 basis points in 2009. In this period, the price impact went up with 2.9 basis points while the effective spread reduced with 0.9 basis points. Because we show medians, the price impact and realized spread do not exactly add up to the effective spread.
Despite the reduction in Depth.X /, the local price impact, realized and effective spreads are almost identical to those of the global order book. This finding might be in line with "market tipping", where the local market switches between periods of relatively high liquidity, in which it attracts all trading, and periods of low liquidity, in which trading takes place at competing trading venues. As the price impact, effective and realized spread are based on trades, relatively liquid periods receive a larger weight in the calculation.
Equity market fragmentation
To proxy for the level of fragmentation in each stock, we construct a daily HerfindahlHirschman Index (H H I ) based on the number of shares traded on each visible trading venue, similar to e.g. Bennett and Wei (2006) and Weston (2002) 
it , or the squared market share of venue v, summed over all N venues for firm i on day t. We then use V is Frag D 1 H H I , short for visible fragmentation; such that a single dominant market has zero fragmentation whereas V is Frag goes to one in case of complete visible fragmentation. In addition, Dar k is our proxy for dark trading, calculated as the percentage of volume executed at dark pools, crossing networks, internalizers and OTC. We use the percentage of dark volume since we do not have information on fragmentation within the different dark venues. However, separating visible competition and dark trading is important, as they may affect liquidity in a different fashion. Our measure of fragmentation is more accurate than that of O'Hara and Ye (2011), where the origin of trades are classified as either Nasdaq, NYSE or external. The benefits of competition in their paper arise from the external venues, but the actual level of fragmentation, and whether they are dark or lit, is unclear. Table 2 In the next section, we estimate the effect of fragmentation on various liquidity measures in a regression framework.
The impact of visible fragmentation and dark trading on global and local liquidity
This section first explains the methodology, and then presents the regression results of the base model, for the global and local order book.
Methodology
We employ multivariate panel regression analysis to study the impact of visible fragmentation and dark trading on liquidity. We have a panel dataset with 52 firms and 1022 days, In the regressions we include volatility, price, firm size and volume as control variables, which is common in this literature. Descriptives of these control variables are presented in Table 1 . 20 In addition, we include a proxy for algorithmic activity, as this has been found to improve liquidity (e.g. Hendershott and Riordan (2009) ). We construct a measure similar to Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) . On average, algorithmic traders place and cancel many limit orders, so the daily number of electronic messages proxies for their activity, i.e. placement and cancelations of limit orders and market orders. This variable is divided by trading volume, as increasing volumes lead to more electronic messages even in the absence of algorithmic trading. Accordingly, Algo it is defined as the number of electronic messages divided by trading volume for firm i on day t.
The dependent variable in these regressions is one of the liquidity measures, and the independent variables are the level of fragmentation and dark trading, and several control variables. As the effect of fragmentation on liquidity might not be linear, we add a quadratic term. We employ V is Frag it D 1 H H I it and V is Frag 2 it to measure fragmentation, where V is Frag it D 0 if trading in a firm is completely concentrated. We add firm fixed effects to make sure the variation we pick up is due only to variability in fragmentation and dark trading relative to the firm's own average. We also add time effects to control for common, market wide fluctuations in all variables. We use quarterly time fixed effects, but the results are almost identical when using day or month dummies instead of quarter dummies. The regression equation thus becomes
where i are the firm fixed effects and q.t/ are 16 quarterly dummies that take the value of one if day t is in quarter q, and zero otherwise. For the inference we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey-West for panel datasets), based on five lags.
Results: global liquidity
The regression results for the liquidity measures employing the global (consolidated) order book are reported in Table 3 . The results of models (1) Table 2 reports that the standard deviation of visible fragmentation is 0:15 in the entire sample, so variation in visible fragmentation has a large impact on liquidity throughout the entire order book.
We now investigate the impact of visible fragmentation on the other liquidity indica-tors, as reported in models (6) to (10) in Table 3 . At the optimal degree of visible fragmentation, V is Frag D 0:35, the price impact and effective spread reduce by 6:3 and 6:8 basis points compared with a completely concentrated market, respectively. This is large, considering that the median effective spread in 2009 is 13:3 basis points ( Table 7) . The economic impact of the optimal degree of visible fragmentation on the effective spread in our analysis is larger than estimated in O'Hara and Ye (2011) Table 1 , it appears that the quoted depth is not a suitable liquidity measure in the period we study. Possibly, this is a consequence of algorithmic traders who place many small and price improving orders.
We now turn to the effects of dark trading on liquidity. In Table 3 , the coefficients on Dar k are strongly negative, with a coefficient of 0:91 for Ln Depth.10/. As a result, a one standard deviation (0:18) increase in the fraction of dark trading reduces Depth.10/ by 16%. In addition, the coefficient on the price impact of 4:1 suggests that dark trading leads to more adverse selection and informed trading on the visible markets. Both findings are consistent with the theoretical work of Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Zhu (2011) , where dark markets are more attractive to uninformed traders, leaving the informed traders to the visible markets. The intuition is that informed traders typically trade at the same side of the order book, and therefore face relatively low execution probabilities in the dark pool or crossing network. As a result, the dark market "cream-skims" uninformed order flow, worsening liquidity and adverse selection costs in the visible market. The reduction in depth at the visible exchanges is also consistent with the model of Buti, Rindi, and 21 O'Hara and Ye (2011) find a linear coefficient on "market share outside the primary markets" of 9 basis points, while the average level is 0.35, resulting in a benefit of approximately 3 basis points.
Werner (2010b), since limit orders migrate from the limit order book to the dark pool.
Empirically, our results are consistent with Weaver (2011) , who shows that off exchange reported trades, which mostly qualify as dark trades in his sample, negatively affect market quality for US stocks. Our results contrast Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a), who find that dark pool activity improves the quoted spread in the cross section. In time series regressions however, similar to ours, the authors find statistically marginally significant and economically insignificant results. In addition, the authors do not control for the degree of visible fragmentation, and for trades on crossing networks and OTC. Trading activity across such venues is likely to be correlated, implying an omitted variables bias. For example, dark pool activity is generally higher for larger firms, which also benefit more from higher levels of visible fragmentation in our sample.
The decision to trade in the dark might be endogenous as low levels of visible liquidity may induce an investor to trade in the dark, implying that they are substitutes. Alternatively, both markets can be considered complements, since a liquid OTC market forces limit order suppliers in the visible market to improve prices as well, and vice versa (e.g., Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005)). We tackle such reverse causality issues with an instrumental variables regression in section 6.2, but our main results are robust.
Turning to the control variables of the regressions, we find that the economic magnitude of Algo is fairly small and negative. For example, a one standard deviation increase (s D 0:36), lowers the Depth.X / measures with 4%. However, as Algo might be indirectly related to fragmentation, we want to be careful in interpreting this result. The remaining control variables in the regressions have the expected signs. Larger firms tend to be more liquid, while the effect of price is marginally positive and economically small. As expected, increased trading volumes are related to better liquidity, but the causality might go either way. Finally, volatility has a negative impact on liquidity; especially for liquidity close to the midpoint. Not surprisingly, the price impact strongly increases in volatility, which proxies for the amount of information in the market.
Results: Local liquidity
We now turn to the impact of fragmentation available at the regulated market, which we call local liquidity. The estimates are reported in Table 4 and displayed in the lower panel of (2002) for instance, who finds that the liquidity on Nasdaq improves when ECNs enter the market and compete for order flow. The difference is probably due to the market structure in the US, where Nasdaq market makers lost their oligopolistic rents after the entry of ECNs.
We now turn to the regressions of the remaining liquidity measures in Table 4 , columns (6) to (10). In contrast to Depth.10/, these are not adversely affected by visible fragmentation. It might be the case that Euronext is very liquid on some parts of the day, while relatively illiquid during other parts. As the effective spread is based on trades, more liquid periods with many trades receive a larger weight in the calculation. In addition, order splitting behavior and smaller average order sizes may also generate lower average effective spreads.
Finally, the quoted spread on Euronext improves with visible fragmentation, while the quoted depth reduces with 30% at V is Frag D 0:35. Given the reduction in Depth.10/, the gains of improved prices are more than offset by the lower quantities offered.
Robustness checks
In this section we investigate the robustness of our main results. First, we control for potential endogeneity issues by introducing firm-quarter fixed effects. These control for the simultaneous interactions between market structure, the degree of fragmentation, liquidity and competition in the market. In addition, this approach controls for a specific reverse causality issue, where fragmentation tends to be higher for high volume and more liquid stocks (Cantillon and Yin, 2010) . To tackle remaining endogeneity problems of the visible fragmentation and dark trading variables we use an instrumental variables estimator. The instruments are (i) the number of limit to market orders on the new competing venues, (ii) the logarithm of the average order size of the new competing venues and (iii) the logarithm of dark order size; and their respective squares. We conclude by analyzing large and small firms separately, along with some additional robustness checks.
Regression analysis: firm-time effects
In this section we add to (2) firm-quarter dummies. Instead of a single dummy for a period of four years, we add 16 quarterly dummies per firm. This approach is similar to Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009), who analyze the effect of algorithmic trading on volatility for currencies, and add separate quarter dummies for each currency pair. The procedure is aimed to solve the following issues.
First, the firm-quarter dummies make the analysis more robust to the impact of the financial crisis and industry specific shocks. For example, if the financial crisis specifically affects certain firms or industries (e.g., the financial sector), and affects both liquidity and fragmentation, then the previous analysis might suffer from an omitted variables problem, leading to a bias in the coefficients on fragmentation. The firm-quarter dummies capture industry shocks and time-varying firm specific shocks.
Second, the firm-quarter dummies can control for potential self-selection problems.
For example, Cantillon and Yin (2010) raise the issue that competition might be higher for high volume and more liquid stocks; an effect that will be absorbed by the firm-quarter dummies as long as most variation in volume is at the quarterly level.
Third, the firm-quarter dummies can, at least partially, control for dynamic interactions between market structure, competition in the market, the degree of fragmentation and liquidity. Specifically, such interactions are dynamic as, for example, a change in the current market structure will affect the level of competition in the future, which, in turn, will affect the market structure and liquidity in the future. Our approach controls for the long-term interactions of such forces by only allowing for variation in liquidity and fragmentation within a firm-quarter. Accordingly, the dummy variables absorb the variation between quarters, which is likely to be more prone to endogeneity issues. Table 3 . The effect of visible fragmentation on liquidity is smaller but still highly significant. This is easily explained as the firm-quarter dummies absorb long-term trends in visible fragmentation, while only the day-to-day fluctuations remain. From the regression results, it appears that removing the long-term variation dampens the estimated daily effects. Second, liquidity deeper in the order book benefits less from visible fragmentation than liquidity close to the midpoint does.
This finding was also observed in Figure 5 , but becomes more pronounced. The fact that Depth.10/ still improves strongly with visible fragmentation suggests that competition of new trading venues mainly takes place at liquidity close to the midpoint. The coefficients on Dar k show a similar pattern as those reported in Table 3 , but are about 15% lower in magnitude. That is, the detrimental effect of dark activity on liquidity remains.
The impact of visible fragmentation on local liquidity, including firm-quarter effects, is shown in panel B of Table 5 
An instrumental variables approach
In the instrumental variables regressions we aim to solve for more general reverse causality issues of fragmentation and dark trading. For example, Frag might be high because a stock is very liquid on a particular day; or Dar k might be high when an investor substitutes the visible market for dark trading because the visible market is illiquid. In such cases V is Frag and Dar k depend on liquidity, causing us to make incorrect interpretations of the regression coefficients.
We employ an instrumental variables specification to alleviate these problems. We instrument V is Frag, V is Frag 2 and Dar k with (i) the ratio of the number of limit orders to the number of market orders on the visible competitors (Bats Europe, Chi-X, Nasdaq OMX and Turquoise), 22 (ii) the logarithm of the visible competitors average order size and (iii) the logarithm of the average Dar k order size, for each stock and day. These instruments are specifically aimed to tackle the aforementioned reverse causality issues. The first instrument, the ratio of limit to market orders on the visible competitors, is negatively related to fragmentation. After the startup of a new venue, typically the number of transactions is very low, while the available liquidity can already be substantial. As the venue reaches critical mass, the number of transactions will increase sharply, lowering the ratio and boosting fragmentation. We argue that the instrument is exogenous, as it is not clear how higher levels of visible liquidity would reduce the ratio of limit to market orders on the visible competitors. The second instrument, the logarithm of the visible competitors order size, positively relates to fragmentation as larger orders typically increase competitors market share. 23 Since the regression controls for total traded volume, it is unclear how a shift of volume from the primary market to the new competitors improves liquidity, except via fragmentation. The third instrument, the logarithm of average dark order size, positively affects dark activity. In a similar fashion to the previous instrument, larger dark orders increase dark market share. The instrument seems exogenous, since we do not expect lower visible liquidity to increase the average dark order size. The I V regressions include firm-quarter dummies, and we use the two stage GMM estimator which is efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Stock and Yogo, 2002) .
The regression results are reported in panel C and D of Table 5 and displayed in Figure   7 . First, we observe that the magnitudes of the coefficients on visible fragmentation have strongly increased and are highly significant. At V is Frag D 0:35, global Depth.10/ and Depth.50/ improve with 100% and 32% compared with a completely concentrated market. The standard errors have strongly increased, as the I V procedure reduces the accuracy with which the coefficients are estimated. Importantly, Figure 7 shows that the optimal level of visible fragmentation is similar to previous specifications, and we confirm again that Depth.10/ benefits most from visible fragmentation. The coefficients on Dar k have slightly increased in magnitude compared with those reported in panel A and B of Table 5 and are highly significant. Assuming exogenous instruments, in economical terms the initial estimates did not suffer from endogeneity issues.
Turning to the I V results for local liquidity, panel D of Table 5 and the lower panel in However, we prefer the current setup, as it allows us to perform overidentifying restrictions tests.
Small versus large stocks
The benefits and drawbacks of fragmentation on liquidity might hinge on certain stock characteristics, such as firm size. We pursue the point in question by executing the base specification regressions for large stocks, with an average market cap exceeding ten billion Euro, and small stocks, with an average market cap below 100 million Euro. The results for the global and local order books of 15 large and 14 small sample stocks are reported in Table 6 , panel A to D. The coefficients for the global order book are plotted in Figure   8 , and show two interesting results. First, the benefits of visible fragmentation are higher for large stocks than for small stocks. For large firms, the Depth.10/ is 64% higher at V is Frag D 0:35, while for small firms the maximum, at V is Frag D 0:18; has 30% more liquidity compared with a completely concentrated market. Second, the figure shows that the benefit of visible fragmentation for large stocks is monotonically positive, meaning there are no harmful effects of fragmentation. By contrast, the liquidity of small stocks is negatively affected for levels of visible fragmentation exceeding 0:36. This suggests that the benefits of visible fragmentation strongly depend on firm size. The harmful effect of Dar k activity on liquidity is similar for small and large stocks.
Turning to the regressions in panel C and D of Table 6 , we find that the local liquidity of large stocks also increases with visible fragmentation, while that of small stocks strongly decreases. That is, at Frag D 0:35, Depth.10/ of large stocks improves by 12%, while that of small stocks reduces with 38%. Again, this confirms that the drawbacks of a fragmented market place mainly hold for relatively small stocks. The fact that large stocks benefit more from visible fragmentation is in line with their actual levels of fragmentation, which is 0:41 in 2009, while for small stocks only 0:21.
Additional robustness checks
To investigate the sensitivity of our results, we perform a number of robustness checks. Second, we execute the regressions in first differences, i.e. use the daily changes instead of the daily levels. By analyzing the day-to-day changes, we remove the long-term trends in the data. The results are very similar to those using firm-quarter dummies (not reported).
Third, instead of using V is Frag to measure visible fragmentation, we use the market share of the traditional market (Euronext Amsterdam), and the qualitative results do not change. Finally, we have plotted higher order polynomials of V is Frag, and the inverted U-shapes remain, indicating that the finding on an optimal level of visible fragmentation is robust.
Conclusion
Nowadays, stocks are simultaneously traded on a variety of different trading systems, creating a fragmented equity market. We show that the effect of fragmentation on liquidity crucially depends on the type of trading venue -visible versus dark. Our results reveal a key role for pre-trade transparency, which we define as having a publicly displayed limit order book. Liquidity seems to reap the gains of competition for order flow in case of visible fragmentation, whereas dark trading appears to have detrimental effects.
The positive effect of visible fragmentation stems from competition between liquidity suppliers, as evidenced by the reduction in the reward of supplying liquidity. The negative effect of dark trading is consistent with a "cream-skimming" effect, where the dark markets mostly attract uninformed order flow which in turn increases adverse selection costs on the visible markets. We relate this finding to pre-trade transparency, which has been shown to reduce adverse selection costs (e.g., Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005)). As such, we provide a deeper understanding of the current view that market fragmentation improves liquidity.
More general, our results imply that the type of trading venue determines the overall costs and benefits of competition between trading venues.
Next to separating visible from dark fragmentation, we explicitly differentiate between global and local liquidity. Global liquidity takes all relevant trading venues into account while local liquidity only the traditional stock market. Although global liquidity improves with visible fragmentation, local liquidity does not. That is, limit orders migrate from the local exchange to the competing trading platforms, such that an investor with only access to the traditional market is worse off. The reduction in liquidity close to the midpoint, i.e. at relatively good prices, can be more than 10% compared to the case of no visible fragmentation. In addition, we find that competition between trading venues is fiercer for larger stocks, as these are more fragmented and have a higher marginal benefit of visible fragmentation. Also, large stocks do not face the drawbacks of visible fragmentation like small stocks do. This suggests that the benefits and drawbacks of fragmentation also depend on certain stock characteristics, size in particular.
In sum, our results add to the policy discussion on competition in financial markets, which is amplified by recent financial regulation (Reg NMS in the US and MiFID in Europe, both implemented in 2007). In addition, our results can be seen in light of fair markets and investor protection. While overall market quality has improved, investors without access to all visible and dark markets, typically retail investors, are worse off. and investors, which would ultimately improve market quality. The regulation entails three major changes to achieve this goal.
First, competition between trading venues is introduced by abolishing the "concentration rule" 24 and allowing three types of trading systems to compete for order flow. These are regulated markets (RMs), Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and Systematic Internalisers (SIs). RMs are the traditional exchanges, matching buyers and sellers through an order book or through dealers. A firm chooses on which RM to list, and once listed, MTFs may decide to organize trading in that firm as well. MTFs, who closely resemble ECNs in 24 The "concentration rule", adopted by some EU members, obliges transactions to be executed at the primary market as opposed to internal settlement. This creates a single and fair market on which all investors post their trades, according to a time and price priority. The repeal of the rule however allows markets to become fragmented and increases competition between trading venues (Ferrarini and Recine, 2006). the US, are similar to RMs in matching third party investors, but have different regulatory requirements and 'rules of the game'. For example, MTFs and RMs can decide upon the type of orders that can be placed, and the structure of fees, i.e. fixed fees, variable fees as well as make or take fees. 25 In order to survive, MTFs need to obtain a sufficient level of liquidity from order flow of their owners and outside investors. The largest MTFs with visible liquidity are Chi-X, Bats Europe, Nasdaq OMX and Turquoise. Lastly, SIs are organized by investment banks where customers trade against the inventory of the SI or with other clients, resembling market dealers.
MiFIDs second keystone refers to transparency which guarantees the flow of information in the market. As the number of trading venues increases, information about available prices and quantities in the order books becomes dispersed. Consequently, for investors to decide on the optimal venue and to evaluate order execution, a sufficient degree of pretrade and post-trade transparency is necessary. Pre-trade transparency rules require trading venues to make (part of) their order books public and to continuously update this information. However, a number of waivers exist regarding pre-trade transparency. In particular, there is the "large-in-scale orders waiver", the "reference price waiver", the "negotiatedtrade waiver", and the "order management facility waiver". 26 These waivers are used by MTFs such as dark pools and broker-dealer crossing networks who only have to report executed trades. Whether transparency has improved is a topic of current debate, which is complicated by increasingly fragmented markets, technological innovations and shortcomings in the quality of post-trade information. 27 The third and final pillar of MiFID is the introduction of the best-execution rule, which obliges investment firms to execute orders against the best available conditions with respect to price, liquidity, transaction costs and likelihood and speed of execution. However, such a broad definition of best-execution policy allows investment firms to decide themselves where to route their orders to. For example, an investment firm may stipulate an execution policy of trading on one market only. In absence of a clear benchmark, it becomes difficult for investors to evaluate the quality of executed trades and the overall performance of an investment firm (Gomber and Gsell, 2006) . This is the main difference between MiFID and its US counterpart, Reg NMS, which solely focusses on the price dimension. 28 For an 25 Make and take fees are costs charged to investors supplying and removing liquidity, respectively. Make fees can be negative, such that providers of liquidity receive a rebate for offering liquidity. 26 See also Directive 2004/39/EC, article 29. 27 CESR proposes changes to MiFID, July 29, 2010, ref. 10-926. 28 In the U.S., the price of every trade is reported to the consolidated tape, such that the performance of a extensive summary of the implementation process of MiFID we refer the interested reader to Ferrarini and Recine (2006) .
Appendix B: liquidity measures
The liquidity measures other than Depth.X / are explained in this section. We calculate 
The price impact, realized and effective spread are first calculated per trade, based on the midpoint of that trading venue. Then, all calculations are averaged over the trading day, weighted by traded volume. Next, we average over trading venues, again weighted by trading venue. This approach gives the average spread in the whole market. Limited computer power is the reason we use the midpoint of the trading venue where the trade took place instead of the consolidated midpoint. That is, creating a consolidated midpoint quote-byqoute, as is required for the effective and realized spreads, is computationally much more burdensome than creating a consolidated order book using one-minute snapshots. 29 The price impact and realized spread are calculated between 09.00 -16.25, while the effective spread on 9.00 -16.30. Therefore, E f f ective spr ead Reali zed spr ead C Price broker can clearly be evaluated. 29 Our dataset also has a consolidated tape constructed by Thomson Reuters, containing best prices, quantities and all visible trades in the market. However, extensive checking shows that the time stamp of these trades may differ up to three seconds from the time stamp of the same trades in the original file. 
Note that the quoted depth on Euronext can be larger than that of the consolidated order book, for example when Chi-X offers a better price but with a lower quantity. The quoted spread of the consolidated order book is always equal or better than that of Euronext. Finally, the quoted depth is identical to Depth.10/ when the quoted spread equals 20 basis points.
BENNETT, P., AND L. WEI ( (Panel A) , and additional descriptive statistics of the sample stocks (Panel B) . The medians are based on 52 firms and 250 trading days per year (11.250 observations). Depth.X / is expressed in e1000s and represents the offered liquidity within X basis points around the midpoint. The effective spread, realized spread, price impact and quoted spread are measured in basis points. The price impact and realized spread are based on a 5 minute time window. The quoted depth is the amount of shares, in e1000s, offered at the best bid and ask price of the global and local order book. The descriptives show the natural logarithm of firm size, traded volume, realized return volatility (Ln SD) and algorithmic trading. Return volatility is defined as the daily standard deviation of 15 minute returns on the midpoint. Typically, this standard deviation is lower than one, so the natural logarithm becomes negative. Algo represents the number of electronic messages in the market divided by total traded volume (per e10.000). An electronic message occurs when a limit order in the order book is executed, changed or canceled. Table ( 3) The effect of fragmentation on global liquidity.
The dependent variable in models (1) - (5) is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure based on the consolidated order book. The Depth(X) is expressed in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. The effective spread, realized spread, price impact and quoted spread, (6) -(9), are measured in basis points. Ln quoted depth is the logarithm of the quoted depth in Euros (10). VisFrag is the degree of visible market fragmentation, defined as 1 H H I . Dark is the percentage of order flow executed OTC, on crossing networks, dark pools and internalized. Algo represents the number of electronic messages divided by traded volume in the market (per e100); the other variables are explained in the descriptive statistics and Table 2 . The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for 52 stocks, and have firm fixed effects and quarter dummies. T-stats are shown below the coefficients, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) Table ( 4) The effect of fragmentation on local liquidity.
The dependent variable in models (1) - (5) is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure based on the order book of Euronext Amsterdam. The Depth(X) is expressed in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. The effective spread, realized spread, price impact and quoted spread, (6) -(9), are measured in basis points. Ln quoted depth is the logarithm of the quoted depth in Euros (10). VisFrag is the degree of visible market fragmentation, defined as 1 H H I . Dark is the percentage of order flow executed OTC, on crossing networks, dark pools and internalized. Algo represents the number of electronic messages divided by traded volume in the market (per e100); the other variables are explained in the descriptive statistics and Table 2 . The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for 52 stocks, and have firm fixed effects and quarter dummies. T-stats are shown below the coefficients, calculated using robust Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) Table ( Table 2 . The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for 52 stocks. T-stats are shown below the coefficients, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table ( 6) The effect of fragmentation on liquidity: large and small firms.
The base specification regressions are executed separately for the 15 smallest stocks (average market cap < 100 million) and the 14 largest stocks (average market cap > 10 billion); for the global and local order books. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure. The Depth(X) is expressed in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. VisFrag is the degree of visible fragmentation, defined as 1 H H I . Dark is the percentage of order flow executed OTC, on crossing networks, dark pools and internalized. For the sake of brevity, the coefficients on the control variables are not reported, as they are very similar to those of Tables 3 and 4 . The control variables are Ln size, Ln price, Ln volume, Ln volatility and algo, as explained in Table 2 . The regressions contain firm fixed effects and quarter dummies. T-stats are shown below the coefficients and calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 3 ) and local order book (lower panel, model (1) -(5) of Table 4 ). The vertical axis displays the logarithm of the depth(X), while the horizontal axis shows the level of visible fragmentation (Frag), defined as (1 -HHI). Table 6 ). The 14 large stocks have an average market cap exceeding ten billion Euro, while the 15 small caps Large stocks consist of the 14 stocks with an average market cap exceeding ten billion Euro, while the 15 small stocks have a market cap smaller than 100 million Euro. The regressions include firm-quarter dummies. The vertical axis displays the logarithm of the depth(X), while the horizontal axis shows the level of visible fragmentation, defined as (1 -HHI).
